The aim of this paper is to investigate how risk attitudes in medical decisions for others vary across health contexts. A lab experiment was designed to elicit the risk attitudes of 257 medical and nonmedical students by assigning them the role of a physician who must decide between treatments for patients. An interval regression model was used to estimate individual coefficients of relative risk aversion, and an estimation model was used to test for the effect of type of medical decision and experimental design characteristics on elicited risk aversion. We find that (a) risk attitudes vary across different health contexts, but risk aversion prevails in all of them; (b) students enrolled in health-related degrees show a higher degree of risk aversion; and (c) real rewards for third parties (patients) make subjects less risk-averse. The results underline the importance of accounting for attitudes towards risk in medical decision making. 
In addition, the stability of risk preferences is a crucial question among economists, psychologists, and behavioral researchers. Economists have generally assumed that individuals exhibit a single risk preference that governs risk-taking behavior in all circumstances. However, this has been debated within the psychology literature, as there is evidence that risk attitudes vary across different outcomes and domains (Hanoch, Johnson, & Wilke, 2006; MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1990; Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002) . In fact, recent economic papers have also acknowledged the existence of domain-specific risk preferences (Barseghyan, Prince, & Teitelbaum, 2011; Einav, Finkelstein, Pascu, & Cullen, 2012; . However, with the exception of van der Pol and Ruggeri (2008) , Ruggeri and van der Pol (2012) (hereafter van der Pol & Ruggeri, 2008 , and Schosser et al. (2016) , we are not aware of studies that have analyzed whether risk attitudes vary across different contexts within the health domain. 2 With these questions in mind, this paper contributes to this scarce literature on risk attitudes in the health domain by applying an experimental economics approach. The use of controlled laboratory experiments in health economics is growing (Brosig-Koch, Hennig-Schmidt, Kairies, & Wiesen, 2016; Buckley et al., 2012; Galizzi & Wiesen, in press; Godager & Wiesen, 2013; Schram & Sonnemans, 2011) , as these experiments enable researchers to investigate health topics for which field evidence is difficult to obtain.
We carried out a lab experiment with 257 students by assigning them the role of a physician who must decide between treatments for patients in different contexts. Our aim was to investigate whether the risk attitudes of these subjects vary across outcomes within the health domain. Our investigation focused on risk attitudes when deciding for others, that is, the students acted as doctors prescribing treatments for their patients. Risk attitudes in "decisions for others" have received much less attention in the health domain than in decisions for oneself. However, there is evidence that physicians recommend different treatments for patients than they would choose for themselves (Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2012; Ubel, Angott, & Zikmund-Fisher, 2011). 3 In order to investigate whether risk attitudes are context-dependent, we introduced three health contexts that correspond to three different types of medical decisions: a context with outcomes expressed as years of life in perfect health, a context of a terminal illness with outcomes expressed as months of life in moderate-ill health, and a context with outcomes expressed as hours of pain alleviated after surgery.
We run our experiment with medical students and students enrolled in other non medical degrees, which allow us to approximate physicians' decisions and to test for the effects of university degree (health related vs. nonhealth related) on treatment choices.
Finally, it is important to note that most of the health literature on preference elicitation has used hypothetical questions (see , for a review). In the money domain, there is mixed evidence about whether risk attitudes differ depending on whether hypothetical or real rewards are used. Although some find that risk attitudes differ between hypothetical and money-rewarded questions (Holt & Laury, 2002; Holt & Laury, 2005; Harrison & Rutström, 2008b) , others suggest that there is no such difference (Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, & Kammoun, 2013; Bardsley et al., 2010; Camerer & Hogarth, 1999; Cohen, Ericson, Laibson, & White, 2016; Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001) . As this question is still being debated, and evidence from health experiments with real rewards is scarce, we are interested to determine whether elicited preferences for health treatments differ between purely hypothetical frameworks and frameworks where real rewards are at stake. For this purpose, participants in the real group were informed that the money obtained as a result of their medical decisions would be transferred to an internationally known nonprofit institution that provides medical services for the poorest populations in India.
In order to elicit preferences, we used a multiple price list (MPL) method, using the well-known test developed by Holt & Laury in 2002 . The Holt & Laury method has been widely used in experimental economics to evaluate risk preferences in a variety of contexts (Andersen, Harrison, Lau, & Rutström, 2008; Charness & Viceisza, 2017; Dohmen & Falk, 2011; see Filippin & Crosetto, 2016 , for a review on Holt & Laury experiments) . 4 However, it has been scarcely applied in the health domain, where standard gamble methods are the most commonly used methods to elicit preferences towards health risks. The exceptions are and Galizzi, Miraldo, Stavropoulou, and M. van Der Pol (2016) , which adapt the questions of Holt and Laury (2002) (Farquhar, 1984) , which avoids the "certainty effect" 5 identified as a weakness of the Standard Gamble and makes it easier for subjects to understand and choose an option. 6 Moreover, there is evidence suggesting that Expected Utility is more descriptively valid when subjects compare pairs of nondegenerate gambles (Abdellaoui, Driouchi, & L'Haridon, 2011; Bleichrodt, Abellan-Perpinan, Pinto-Prades, & Mendez-Martinez, 2007) . Because the Holt & Laury method can potentially result in a bias towards the choice of options located in the middle of the table where risk neutrality is defined (Andersen, Harrison, Lau, & Rutström, 2006; Charness, Gneezy, & Imas, 2013; Harrison, List, & Towe, 2007; Harrison & Rutström, 2008a; Lévy-Garboua, Maafi, Masclet, & Terracol, 2012) , we followed Andersen et al. (2006) and developed two asymmetric frames that are skewed in opposite directions.
Our results confirm that risk preferences are context-dependent. Although risk aversion dominates in all types of medical decisions, participants in the experiment seem to exhibit more risk aversion in the context of hours of pain alleviated. The finding that risk aversion differs according to context corroborates previous studies (van der Pol & Ruggeri, 2008 , but the finding that our subjects are clearly risk averse in all contexts does not. Our findings also show that students who are enrolled in health-related degrees were more risk averse than students from other degrees. Finally, we find that introducing real rewards that affect others (i.e., patients) seems to make subjects less risk averse. Regarding the asymmetric frames, biases or "skewness effects" are small and do not affect the main conclusions of the paper.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we present our research questions. Section 3 describes the experimental design and procedures for collecting data. Section 4 explains the methods followed. Section 5 presents the results. Finally, Section 6 discusses the results and concludes with suggestions for further research.
| RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In addition to eliciting preferences towards risk in medical decisions for others, this paper seeks to address three research questions:
Research Question 1: Is risk attitude context-dependent in the health domain, that is, is risk aversion constant for all types of medical decisions?
As mentioned in the previous section, recent economic papers have acknowledged the existence of domain-specific risk preferences. For instance, households are more risk averse when making choices about home insurance as compared to car insurance (Barseghyan et al., 2011) . Or, similarly, individuals are less risk averse in the financial domain as compared to the health domain . Based on these findings, it seems likely that different risk attitudes can be found across different kinds of medical problems (see also Massin et al., 2015; MichelLepage et al., 2013; Nightingale & Grant, 1988, and Schosser et al., 2016) . Using the certainty equivalent method and the probability equivalent method, van der Pol and Ruggeri (2008 Ruggeri ( , 2012 find that risk attitudes in the health sector are indeed context-dependent: Individuals tend to be risk averse with respect to gambles that involve risk of immediate death and risk seeking in gambles involving quality of life, although they find conflicting evidence in the case of gambles involving life expectancy without risk of immediate death. 7 In this paper, we aim to provide further evidence concerning the variation of risk attitude across medical contexts, in this case using a different elicitation method procedure based on 4 The prevalent use of the Holt-Laury measure has allowed researchers to compare risk attitudes across a wide array of contexts and environments. In turn, this has facilitated a less fragmented approach to the study of risk preferences that minimizes methodological differences and aims to characterize a more general phenomenon (Charness et al., 2013) .
5 Standard gamble compares a lottery with a certain option. This can overweight the certain option as outlined by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) . 6 In addition, as Holt and Laury (2013) state: "having lotteries for both options controls for a difference in complexity, that is, the time required to determining the payoff, or a preference for playing or avoiding the lottery independently of the probabilities involved." 7 In the 2008 paper, they found that subjects were risk seeking in this case, whereas in the 2012 paper, they were risk averse.
Holt & Laury's measure of risk aversion. Accordingly, in the experiment, we designed three different health contexts that had not been previously analyzed for this purpose in the literature. Research Question 2: Are students enrolled in health-related degrees different from others regarding risk aversion?
The experimental literature has shown that there are differences of risk preference across different subgroups, as found between men and women (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999) , between young and old (Harrison, Lau, & Rutström, 2007) , and between novices and experts (Dyer, Kagel, & Levin, 1989) . Moreover, different papers show that medical students behave differently in areas such as other-regarding motivation and moral behavior (Hennig-Schmidt & Wiesen, 2014; Jagsi & Lehmann, 2004) . Thus, it seems reasonable to expect that risk preferences differ between medical students (future physicians) and nonmedical students because the former have higher awareness of the benefits and risks involved in health treatments. In our experiment, students from health and nonhealth degrees were recruited in a proportion of 2 to 1.
Research Question 3: Do real rewards play a role in eliciting preferences for treatments if the payments affect a third party?
Several well-known studies in the literature that compare hypothetical versus money-rewarded questions have yielded results indicating a higher degree of risk aversion for the group with real rewards (Harrison & Rutström, 2008b; Holt & Laury, 2002; Holt & Laury, 2005) . Others, however, do not find significant differences (Abdellaoui et al., 2013; Bardsley et al., 2010; Camerer & Hogarth, 1999; Cohen et al., 2016; Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001 ). However, all of these studies were carried out in the money domain and participants made decisions for themselves. As it cannot be assumed that the same effects will show up in other domains, it is important to investigate how real rewards affect risk attitudes in the health domain when participants make treatment decisions for others. For this purpose, half of the subjects in our experiment were allocated to a treatment where their decisions had "real" consequences for patients outside the lab.
| EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURE

| Experimental design
The experiment composes three parts: (a) A MPL task with a monetary outcome, (b) two MPL tasks with health outcomes, and (c) one MPL task to elicit equity preferences in health.
The results of the two MPL tasks with health outcomes (Part 2 of the experiment) are the main data for our analysis. The MPL task with monetary outcomes (Part 1 of the experiment) was always presented first and functioned as a practice question. The idea behind this is that subjects would more readily understand the MPL task with a familiar outcome like money. The data in Part 3 will be analyzed in a different paper. The order of the tasks of Part 2 (Tasks 2h and 2l, for the skewed-high and skewed-low frames) and the equity task of Part 3 were randomized to test for order effects, so that the following sequences were used: 2h-2l-3, 2l-2h-3, 3-2h-2l, and 3-2l-2h (note that the two tasks of Part 2 were always adjacent). At the end of the sessions, subjects were asked to fill in a sociodemographic questionnaire.
We used a between-subjects design to respond to our three research questions, and a within-subjects design to test for frame-related biases. In order to implement our design, 24 groups (3 health contexts × 2 incentive groups × 4 task sequences) with different questionnaires were needed. Table 1 summarizes our group design. Notice also that each group consisted of a combination of students from health and nonhealth degrees in a ratio of 2:1.
| Implementation of the multiple price list
The goal of the experiment was to analyze risk aversion across three different medical contexts. In each context, subjects had to choose between pairs of lotteries R and S, where R stands for Risky and S for Safe. Let us assume that four health outcomes are ordered from best to worst as follows: H1 > H2 > H3 > H4. The R lottery will be characterized by (p,H1; H4) and the S lottery by (q,H2;H3) where p and q are the probabilities of the best outcome in each lottery. We used three different types of health outcomes (H), described in Subsection 3.3. The "no choice" option (doing nothing) was always stochastically dominated by the R lottery because H4 was at least as good as "no choice." Following Holt and Laury (2002) , participants faced a table with 11 decision rows 8 each of which presents a choice between an S gamble (q,H2; H3), labeled Treatment A in the experiment, and a R gamble (p,H1;H4), labeled Treatment B. In each row, p = q. In 8 Holt & Laury original test has 10 rows, where the last row gives probability 1 to the highest outcome of each lottery. We present 11 rows, adding a row where the lowest outcome of each lottery/treatment get probability 1.
the first row, p = q = 0, and in the eleventh row, p = q = 1. As we move from the first to the 11th row, the probability of the best outcome increases by 10%. The payoffs or health outcomes remain constant. For this reason, in the first row, S stochastically dominates R, and in the eleventh row, R stochastically dominates S. In every row, the subject has to choose between S and R. As we move down in the table, the expected value of both treatments/lotteries increases as the probability of the high health outcome increases, but the expected value of Treatment B increases more quickly than the expected value of Treatment A. Thus, only risk-seeking subjects would take Option B in the second decision and only risk-averse subjects would choose Option B in the second to last decision. The expectation is that a risk neutral subject should cross over to Option B when the expected value of each option is about the same.
| The health contexts
We used three decision contexts corresponding to three types of medical decisions. In each context, the physician does not know the probability of success or failure of the treatment because it changes with unrevealed patient characteristics.
1. Health Context 1 (health gains in years of life in perfect health): Subjects were told that the patient had been diagnosed with a disease X. They had to choose between two treatments (A or B) that prolong life for several years in perfect health. Outcomes H1 to H4 were described in terms of life years gained in perfect health. We chose this health context because it has been shown that subjects have certain aspirations regarding life expectancy (Verhoef, De Haan, & Van Daal, 1994) , which can lead to risk-seeking or risk-averse attitudes depending on these aspirations. 2. Health Context 2 (health gains in months of life in moderate ill-health for patients with reduced life expectancy): Subjects were told that the patient had been diagnosed with a terminal disease X that cannot be cured and that is reasonably expected to result in the death of the patient within a short period. Subjects had to choose between two treatments (A or B) that could prolong life for a few months. Outcomes H1 to H4 were described in terms of months of life gained in moderate ill-health. 9 This context is highly relevant as risk and uncertainty are common elements of critical care situations (Nightingale & Grant, 1988) . For instance, this type of context is commonly found in cases where critical decision-making leads to the rejection of new cancer drugs because of their high cost. 3. Health context 3 (health gains in hours of pain alleviated): Subjects were told that they were treating a patient who had just undergone surgery. The patient would endure acute pain that would be particularly strong in the first 48 hours after surgery but would disappear in 4 or 5 days. Subjects had to choose between Treatment A and B in order to alleviate pain. Thus, outcomes H1 to H4 were described in terms of hours of pain alleviated after surgery. Treatment of pain is highly debated within the clinical community, and it is not clear whether more risk-averse physicians are willing to apply stronger painkillers or, on the contrary, they are more concerned about the side effects of painkillers.
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The three selected contexts accurately portray the kinds of dilemmas that physicians confront regularly in medical practice. They reproduce a range of conditions from minor to critical (e.g., end of life contexts) and thereby establish a basis for comparison between distinct scenarios, which may indicate differences in the degree of risk aversion estimated for each context. We have considered it especially important to include a context of pain treatment and a context Health Context 1 (years of life in perfect health) G1 hypothetical 2h-2l-3 2l-2h-3 3-2h-2l 3-2l-2h 4 G1 real 2h-2l-3 2l-2h-3 3-2h-2l 3-2l-2h 4 Health Context 2 (months of life in moderate ill-health) G2 hypothetical 2h-2l-3 2l-2h-3 3-2h-2l 3-2l-2h 4 G2 real 2h-2l-3 2l-2h-3 3-2h-2l 3-2l-2h 4 Health Context 3 (hours of pain alleviated) G2 hypothetical 2h-2l-3 2l-2h-3 3-2h-2l 3-2l-2h 4 G2 real 2h-2l-3 2l-2h-3 3-2h-2l 3-2l-2h 4 24
of reduced quality of life (end of life context), as it has been observed that preferences for health problems involving quality of life can differ from preferences in situations where outcomes are defined in terms of duration (Attema, Brouwer, & l'Haridon, 2013; Attema, Brouwer, l'Haridon, & Pinto-Prades, 2016) . Notice that the outcomes H1 to H4 took the same values in each of the three health contexts. What distinguishes the contexts is the type of medical decision faced by the subjects, which implies that the interpretation of outcomes differs across contexts (several years of life-expectancy in perfect health, few months of life-expectancy in moderate ill-health, and hours of pain alleviated). Notice also that none of our three contexts is defined in the loss domain because subjects in the experiment always face choices about possible gains for their patients.
| The frames
In order to control for the potential bias towards selecting the middle row, we followed Andersen et al. (2006) and developed two asymmetric frames in which the implied risk attitudes of the middle row are different. We devised the two frames using a simple procedure inspired by Artinger, Brown, and Loomes (2014) . In the first frame, H1 = 39, H2 = 16, H3 = 12, and H4 = 4, and the interpretation of these figures changes with each health context. So, in the first context, 39 refers to 39 years in perfect health; in the second context, it refers to the number of months in moderate illhealth before death; and in the third context, it refers to the number of hours of pain alleviated. The second frame we proposed was almost identical to the first except that the best outcome was 19 instead of 39. This use of two frames generated two skewed distributions: Frame "high skew" corresponded to a scenario in which a risk-neutral person would choose the safe option (S) in the first three rows and then would switch to the risky option (R) as indicated by the following pattern SSSRRRRRRR. Frame "low skew," in contrast, corresponded to a situation in which a risk-neutral agent would switch his/her decision from Treatment A (safe option) to Treatment B (risky option) in row number eight, as indicated by the following pattern SSSSSSSSRRR. Appendix D provides information on how the MPL procedure was implemented, first in the case of frame "high skew" and, later, in the case of frame "low skew" for Health Context 1 (years of life).
| The rewards
All participants in the experiment received a participation fee. The fee amounted to €5 for participants in the "real group" and €15 for those in the "hypothetical group." 12 In the hypothetical group, decisions did not involve additional payments. In the real group, decisions were incentivized and the subjects' choices in the two MPL tasks with health outcomes had "real" consequences for patients outside the lab, which offered an incentive to the participants to take the patient's benefit into account. Subjects in the groups with real payoffs were informed that one of them would be randomly selected at the end of the session and one of his decisions would be used to compute the amount of money transferred to the Vicente Ferrer Foundation. It was explained that the Vicente Ferrer Foundation is an internationally known nonprofit institution that works in Annantapur, India, where the institution has built up a network of health services for the poorest populations. As the main aim of this experiment was to analyze whether risk attitudes are contextdependent in the health domain, we designed payments in such a way that differences in subjects' choices could be attributed only to differences of health context and not to changes in the size of the rewards. For this end, we established a monetary equivalence between different health outcomes (years of life gained in perfect health/months of life gained in moderate ill-health/hours of pain alleviated) of 4 euros per time unit. 13 In addition, subjects were made aware that, if selected, they could benefit patients in Annantapur with a payment of up to €156.
12 On average, all participants obtained a payment of €15, because those individuals assigned to the real group received additional money depending on their choices in Part 1 of the experiment. 13 An interesting extension of our study would be to investigate whether individuals' risk attitudes within the same health context might vary according to the life horizon faced by their patients. Physicians, for instance, may be more or less risk averse within an end-of-life context depending on whether the magnitude of patients' remaining life expectancy is shorter or longer (weeks instead of a few months, or days instead of a few weeks, for instance). Investigating this issue would likely require a recalibration of payments in the real group in order to measure all the outcomes in the same unit. We leave this question open for future research.
| Experimental procedure
The experiment was programmed with z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted at the Laboratory for Research in Experimental Economics (LINEEX) in May 2014. 14 The laboratory recruited 257 undergraduate students from the University of Valencia following standard electronic recruitment procedures. None of the subjects had participated in a similar economic experiment before. We conducted five sessions of approximately 45 min at the lab to collect the data. Students were allocated to one of the 24 potential treatments using quotas so as to have (approximately) the same number of observations for each treatment. Within each treatment, a 2:1 ratio was maintained between health and nonhealth students. Sessions 1, 2, and 3 dealt with health contexts 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Within each group of students, each computer was assigned one of the eight potential treatments (2 rewards groups × 4 task sequences). In Sessions 4 and 5, all health contexts were used. In this case, students were allocated to one of the 24 potential treatments until the quota was full. Table 2 below summarizes the allocation of the participants in Health Context 1 (n = 85). A similar allocation was made in the other two health contexts (n = 86 each).
The experimental procedure in all sessions was as follows: Upon arrival, subjects were randomly assigned to cubicles, where they responded to the questions in full anonymity. The general instructions of the experiment were read aloud. Once the experiment started, specific instructions were shown to participants on the screens of their computers.
Subjects were privately paid at the end of the experiment. In addition, €341 was transferred to the Vicente Ferrer Foundation. This amount reflects the money earned in the experiment as a result of the medical choices of the selected participants in the groups with real payoffs. To validate the actual transfer of money to the foundation, an email was sent to all participants after the experiment with a scanned copy of the check showing the total amount collected. Experimental instructions are provided in Appendices B, C, D, and E.
| METHODS
We assume that risk preferences can be represented by a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function over the health outcomes (H), with a coefficient of CRRA r 15 :
We can infer r based on the 11 decisions made by the individual in each of the two frames analyzed. When individuals switch from the safe option (Treatment A) to the risky option (Treatment B), an interval is elicited where the risk aversion parameter r is located.
As in Holt and Laury (2002) , we can find the lower (r lb ) and upper bound (r ub ) of the interval of r associated to the switching point k. If p k denotes the probability of the best health outcome in each of the decision rows k, with k = {1, …, 11}, then, we can define r lb and r ub as:
)U(H4; r)}, and
Table 3 reports the implicit r intervals for the two skewed frames described in the experimental design section. For subjects with multiple switching points, we follow Andersen et al. (2006) . Thus, when individuals go back and forth between safe and risky options as they move along the decision rows, we assume they are indifferent to the options in the intermediate decision rows, and therefore, we define r lb using the first switch and r ub using the last switch. For example, someone might have the following preferences: SSSRSRRRRRR, that is, three safe choices, then risk in the 4th row, back to safe in the 5th row and, finally, switch to risk from 6th to 11th. In this case, r lb =−0.27 and r ub =0.83 for frame "high skew." 14 Previously, we performed a pretest with 45 students of economics at the Public University of Navarra to confirm that the experiment instructions were clear, and the answers did not present any major problems. 15 Depending on the value of r, individuals exhibit different degrees of risk aversion in the health domain that can be grouped into three types: risk neutral (if r = 0), risk averse (if r > 0), and risk seeker (if r < 0).
The coefficient of relative risk aversion of individual i (r i ) can be assumed to be a linear function of individual characteristics (X i ) and a stochastic term (e i ), as defined in Equation 2.
Individual characteristics X i include whether the subject is enrolled in a health-related degree, age, gender, selfreported health status, weekly disposable income, and level of education of his/her parents, among others.
Because the only observable data is the interval r lb i ; r ub i Â Ã , inferences about β and predictions of r i can be obtained using an interval regression model as described by Harrison, Lau, Rutström, and Sullivan (2005) . In particular, Pr r lb i ≤r i ≤r
, which is used to estimate the model via maximum likelihood. The error term is assumed to follow a normal distribution with censoring, which accounts for choices in the extremes of the decision rows when r lb or r ub goes to infinity. The β parameter related to the dummy variable "health-related major" is used to test the effect of the type of degree on the coefficient of risk aversion (Research Question 2 described in Section 2). In order to answer Research Questions 1 and 3 (see Section 2), we add a set of dummy variables E i reflecting the design of the experiment. That is, we use Model 3:
Three sets of dummy variables are used. First, to test the effect of monetary incentives, we include a dummy variable (E l ) where E l = 0 for the hypothetical group and E l = 1 for the group with financial incentives. The null hypothesis, θ = 0, indicates that financial incentives do not influence the magnitude of the coefficient of relative risk aversion. −0.17 < r ≤ 0.47 9 1.9 < r ≤ 2.52 0.47 < r ≤ 1.36 10 2.52 < r ≤ 3.37 1.36 < r ≤ 2.61 11 3.37 < r < ∞ 2.61 < r < ∞ The second set (E 2 ) corresponds to the health context (health gains in years of life, months of life, or hours of avoided pain). Finally, another set of dummies (E 3 ) indicates the task sequence assigned to the subject, which is used to test for order effects. We test for frame-related biases (what we call "skewness effects") by exploiting the within-subjects design of the experiment. As in Andersen et al. (2006) , we use the two skewed frames faced by all individuals to form a panel of observations. Let r it be the coefficient of relative risk aversion of individual i (i = 1, …, N) inferred from frame t (t = H,L). Equation 3 can now be rewritten as:
Where T iH = 1 if individual i performs frame "high skew," and 0 otherwise. v i is an individual random effect that captures unobserved individual variables and allows for the correlation of responses from the same subject (Harrison & Rutström, 2008b) . The random effect is, by assumption, uncorrelated to observed variables X, E, and T. Equation 4 is estimated via panel data interval regression model. The skewness effect is tested by inference of parameter γ. The null hypothesis, γ = 0, suggests that the skewed-high or low frames do not affect the magnitude of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, thus indicating no skewness effect. Table 4 reports descriptive statistics of all individuals participating in the experiment. The average age of subjects was 23; 61% were female and 69% were students from medicine and other health-related majors. The two columns of Table 4 show the characteristics of the participants separated by health-related and nonhealth-related majors. 16 There were slightly more females in health-related versus nonrelated majors (69% vs. 47%), and most subjects were in their fourth year of studies. The table also includes individual characteristics (e.g., age, gender, and labor activity), characteristics of the experimental design as described in Section 3, and the proportion of multiple switches by frame, which was similar between health-and nonhealth-related students (9% vs. 10%).
| DATA AND RESULTS
| Characteristics of individuals
| Data quality
The data consist of 514 observations (257 subjects performing two task frames). Table 5 shows the distribution of safe choices according to contexts and frames. There is clearly a change in the pattern of responses from one frame to the other as rationality dictates, that is, when the best outcome of the R lottery is 19, subjects chose the S lottery more often than when it is 39. The proportion of inconsistent choices is 9.3% of the total sample (N = 48). It includes choices by subjects who switched several times (5.6%, N = 29), choices by nonswitchers (1.7%, N = 9), and choices by those who select the risky choice in the first decision row (1.9%, N = 10). 17 Notice that the proportion of multiple switchers is small compared to the range of 6% to 21% found in previous studies performing the Holt & Laury test (Anderson & Mellor, 2008; Holt & Laury, 2002; Lusk & Coble, 2005) . Health-related majors include students of medicine (n = 62, or 35% of health-related students), nursing (n = 39, 22%), physiotherapy (n = 35, 20%), pharmacy (n = 14, 8%), and odontologists (n = 28, 16%).
| Estimation of coefficient of relative risk aversion and results
17 Multiple switchers and nonswitchers that select the risky choice in the first decision row are included in the 1.9%. 18 According to the recent survey by Filippin and Crosetto (2016) , the proportion of multiple switchers is about 10% in experiments using the Holt & Laury elicitation method. 19 We also tested for interaction effects between contexts and hypothetical and real groups and between these groups and skewness effects. We did not find statistically significant interactions effects and the average coefficient of relative risk aversion estimated for the model with and without interaction effects does not show statistically significant differences either (1.5635 vs. 1.5632).
the skewed-low frames, as well as an unbalanced panel data regression that combines both frames, assuming a random effect. In general, the estimates of the combined frames (column c) fall within the interval defined by the estimates of the skewed-high (column a) and skewed-low (column b) frames.
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Of the 514 observations, 9 (1.7% of the sample) were excluded from the estimation. These correspond to choices by those who selected the risky choice in the first decision row and then either switched to safe choices or continued with risky choices in the following decision rows, which prevents us from obtaining their implicit coefficient of relative risk aversion. 21 The unbalanced panel data include 255 subjects and 505 observations. 22 Table 6 shows that the health context where individuals decide on hours of pain alleviated for their patients is associated with higher risk aversion. This result is statistically significant for the skewed-high frame (column a) and for the estimation that combines both frames (column c), where the coefficient of relative risk aversion is higher in Context 3 compared to Context 1 by a margin of 0.348 points. No statistical differences are found between the other two contexts. This result responds to our first research question.
Individual characteristics barely affect the coefficient of relative risk aversion. However, one important result that allows us to respond to Research Question 2 is that being enrolled in a medical degree or other health field increases the coefficient of relative risk aversion by 0.308 points (Table 6 , column c), that is, students in health-related fields seem to be more risk averse than those in nonhealth-related fields. However, this result is not observed in the skewed-high frame, where the difference is negligible. 20 The interval regression model was also estimated in a stepwise manner: first, without controls, and then, adding controls one by one. Results obtained in the model with all the variables and controls included are mostly similar to the ones obtained from the regression without controls and those obtained in the intermediate regressions. 21 Two subjects showed this anomalous behavior in both frames, and as a result, their corresponding four observations were excluded from the sample.
Another five subjects made this anomalous choice only in one of the two frames, so just their five corresponding observations were excluded. Notice that we included, however, one observation where the risky choice is chosen in the first decision row but then there are multiple switches. In this case, we estimated the coefficient of relative risk aversion by considering the first row where the subject switched from a safe to a risky decision. 22 If we exclude all multiple switchers and nonswitchers from our sample, the results hold and we do not find statistically significant differences between the average coefficient of relative risk aversion in the two estimations (1.5635 vs. 1.5418). Table 6 also indicates that, when real payments are used, the coefficient of relative risk aversion is lowered by 0.377 points (column c), which addresses Research Question 3. This result is observed in the individual regressions by frames and also in the regression that combines both frames. Our results also show a nonstatistically significant order effect.
| Skewness effects
In Table 6 , we find a statistically significant skewness effect. The implicit coefficient of relative risk aversion is 0.384 points lower in the skewed-low frame compared to the skewed-high frame (column c). To further explore the skewness effect, we present the kernel distribution of predicted r i by skewed frame. Predicted r i are based on interval regression estimation of Equation 3 for each frame, whose parameter estimates are also presented in columns a and b of Table 6 . The average coefficients of relative risk aversion are estimated to be 1.72 and 1.43 when based on skewed-high frame and skewed-low frame, respectively; when both frames are combined in the panel data interval regression, the average coefficient of relative risk aversion is 1.56. Figure 1 shows that the distribution of r i in the skewed-high frame is not only located to the right, avoiding negative values of r, but it is also less disperse, with values more concentrated around the mean.
| Discussion
Our analysis of the risk preferences across different types of medical decisions made on behalf of a patient yields several interesting results for discussion.
First, we find that preferences show a high degree of risk aversion in all health contexts, with risk-averse preferences in nearly 100% of the subjects. This is a new and potentially significant result because almost every other paper that has measured risk aversion in health has shown a mixture of attitudes towards risk (van der Pol and Ruggery, 2012; Schosser et al., 2016) . The result is also outstanding because it was obtained even when one of the frames, the skewed-low frame, invited subjects to show risk-seeking preferences. The divergence of results could also be related to the fact that we focused on decisions for others, although previous works did not. Thus, our prevalence of risk aversion would be in line with the findings in Ubel et al. (2011) and Garcia-Retamero and Galesic (2012) , namely, that doctors more often select a safer medical treatment for their patients than for themselves.
Second, we find differences between medical contexts because individuals are even more risk averse in decisions involving hours of pain alleviated than in the other two contexts. This result is surprising, as one might expect that if the number of quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) involved is smaller, as it is in this context, risk aversion should be also smaller (as happens with monetary outcomes). We wonder whether our result is driven by the fact that participants in the experiment saw an outcome of hours of pain as more plausible and real than an outcome involving shortened life expectancy, and were therefore more cautious in the former context. Whatever the explanation, our result seems to indicate that some of the economic theory predictions on attitudes towards risk with monetary outcomes may have limited validity when applied to health outcomes. Further, the fact that our results indicate that subjects treat pain differently to other health outcomes (at least when making decisions for others), calls into question the adequacy of the QALY model when it is used to represent preferences of outcomes involving pain (very common in health problems). This is a significant finding, given that the QALY model is the dominant method for the economic evaluation of medical treatments. In fact, Mehrez and Gafni (1989) used examples with pain to show the limitations of the QALY model, suggesting, instead, an alternative such as the Healthy Year Equivalent. More recently, Schosser et al. (2016) showed that preferences for duration of pain are different than preferences for intensity of pain. Our findings are aligned with this evidence and suggest that the same utility function should not be used for all kinds of health outcomes. The utility function for health, even if it is a QALY-type utility function, should use different parameters for different health outcomes. Third, the fact that students in health-related degrees seem to be more risk averse than those of other degrees implies that doctors can be highly risk-averse within the context of their medical practice. There are two potential explanations for this finding: The self-selection of risk-averse students in health-related degrees and/or the possibility that healthrelated students have a better understanding of the health decisions they confront. In fact, because participants in the experiment answered Holt & Laury questionnaires in both the monetary domain and the health domain, we were able to compare these questionnaires and found that health-related students are more risk-averse than nonhealth-related students in the health domain but less risk-averse in the monetary domain (see Appendix A, for these results).
23 This result calls into question the linearity of the QALY model, which assumes risk neutrality (Loomes & McKenzie, 1989) . Other papers have already questioned the linearity assumption of the QALY model when subject make decisions for themselves (e.g., Bleichrodt & Pinto, 2005; Schosser et al., 2016) ; we question the linearity assumption when subjects make medical decisions as agents for others. Fourth, our results show a lower degree of risk aversion in the group with real payoffs. This result contrasts with previous findings in the money domain (Harrison & Rutström, 2008b; Holt & Laury, 2002; Holt & Laury, 2005) , where opposite results are found. We can think that real rewards caused subjects to take the experimental task more seriously, so that the change in risk attitudes is the consequence of more careful deliberation about the health consequences for patients. However, we do not find that real payoffs led to fewer inconsistencies. Also, subjects in the hypothetical group took longer to respond to the MPL tasks (178 vs. 140 sec, p < .01), which seems to confirm that they took at least the same interest in responding than the subjects with real payoffs. An alternative explanation may be that our participants in the experiment saw a real patient in India as too distant, affecting the credibility of the rewards and/or decreasing the perceived size of the rewards and leading, as a result, to less risk aversion. Recent findings in the literature indicate that there is a negative correlation between risk aversion and aversion to inequality or inclination towards social preferences in a context of giving donations or giving to others (Müller & Rau, 2016) . This might explain the fact that individuals are willing to take more risk (i.e., are less risk-averse) when real money can be transferred to a nongovernmental organization, as opposed to a hypothetical situation where no real money is involved. In any case, whatever the reason, the effect (change in the coefficient of risk aversion) was not very large. Other studies find no differences between hypothetical groups and groups with real payoffs as mentioned in the Introduction. Thus, this seems to be an issue that needs further exploration.
Finally, the two skewed frames produced different degrees of risk aversion. The vast majority of subjects had a higher degree of risk aversion in the skewed-high frame, which shows that skewness effects did occur. However, the effects were not very important: On aggregate, the difference between the two means (1.72 vs. 1.45) does not seem notable. Even with skewness effects, we can definitely say that there is evidence of risk aversion in the health domain.
Several limitations of this study deserve mention here. One is related to the effect of monetary incentives. When answering the Holt & Laury in the health domain with real payoffs, it is possible that subjects first convert the health outcomes into money, whereas subjects in the hypothetical group focus simply on the health outcomes. In this case, the difference between real and hypothetical groups might be the result of differential risk attitudes between health and monetary outcomes, and not due to the incentives. To ascertain the likelihood of this conversion, we have compared answers to Holt & Laury questionnaires in the monetary and health domains, observing a higher average risk-aversion coefficient in the health domain (see Appendix A). In both cases, there are differences between the real and hypothetical groups. However, in the monetary domain, subjects are more risk averse in the group with real payoffs as compared to the hypothetical group, whereas the opposite occurs in the health domain. Given this result, we cannot rule out the possibility that the group with real payoffs in the health domain is monetizing the health outcomes. 24 This result shows that introducing the right monetary incentives when dealing with health decisions is a challenge that needs further exploration. Another 23 We need to be cautious when interpreting this comparison between Holt & Laury in the monetary domain and the Holt & Laury in the health domain, because the first one was designed just as a practice exercise for participants, and as a result, participants were playing for themselves (and not for others as in the Holt & Laury in the health domain), and the lotteries were not skewed as they were for the health domain.
key question of experimental design was to establish the marginal rate of substitution between health and money. We established a monetary equivalence of €4 per time unit (years/months/hours) for each of the three different health contexts. This rate of exchange was chosen so that the total amount that could be transferred to the nongovernmental organization would be perceived as substantial by the participants. However, Galizzi, Miraldo, Stavropoulou, and van Der Pol (2016) followed a different approach that established 1 day of full health as equivalent to one monetary unit. Establishing this kind of equivalence is not a trivial exercise, and it should be noted that different approaches can lead to different results. Finally, we wish to acknowledge two methodological limitations. The first is related to our use of the Expected Utility framework, which prevents us from considering probability transformations in our model (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) . Thus, it is possible that some of the risk aversion we observed could be attributed to probability transformations. However, it is also true that preference representations that employ probability transformations are mainly relevant when the probability of the event is near to the end-points 0 and 1 (there is no behavioral bias when events are certain or impossible), and in this paper, we do not consider probabilities of events near to 0 and 1. The second limitation is related to estimation strategy: Our panel data interval regression approach relies on the assumption of a CRRA utility function and does not model explicitly behavioral errors. However, the literature shows that our approach produces relatively consistent estimates of CRRA coefficients (Harrison & Rutström, 2008b) . Additional approaches such as structural estimation methods could complement and enrich this type of approach, but these are more commonly used with more flexible utility functions or when utility functions include more than one parameter (see, e.g., Andersen et al., 2008) , which is not our case.
| CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Although it is widely recognized that individual risk attitudes are an important factor in the health domain, risk attitudes in medical decisions for others have hardly been studied, and elicitation techniques that are widely used in economicssuch as the multiple price list-have not been applied systematically.
In this paper, we carried out a lab experiment that investigated the risk attitudes of a group of 257 individuals who were assigned the role of a physician deciding between treatments for a patient. Our main goal was to elicit their risk preferences for others and test whether this individual risk attitude is context-dependent. We used three different decision contexts with health gains expressed in (a) years of life in perfect health, (b) months of life in moderate-ill health for patients with reduced life expectancy, and (c) hours of pain alleviated, and elicited risk preferences for each context using a MPL method.
Results of our study shed light on issues hardly explored until now and also raise interesting questions for future research. First, our results indicate that when decisions are made on behalf of a third party, the introduction of real rewards seems to decrease risk aversion. In our experiment, participants' decisions determined the monetary rewards that were to be transferred to the Vicente Ferrer Foundation. It would be interesting to explore alternative ways to incentivize medical decisions on behalf of a third party, and analyze how different incentives for physicians influence their risk preferences and treatment choices when making decisions for others. Second, future research should also explore why our results find such a large prevalence of risk aversion, unlike previous findings in the field of health. A comprehensive study that uses the same preference elicitation method to compare medical decisions for self-treatment versus treatment for others within different health contexts would help to clarify some of the issues and questions raised in the discussion. Finally, it is important to question the extent to which responses to a task such as the MPL can predict risk preferences in real-life decisions. As mentioned in the Introduction, the Holt & Laury method overcomes some of the disadvantages of standard gamble methods, which are the most commonly used methods to elicit preferences towards health risks. At the same time, it is a feasible and convenient method that typical subjects (i.e., university students) can use without much confusion. But whether doctors are really so risk averse in practice is a question that needs further exploration. Galizzi, Miraldo, Stavropoulou, and van Der Pol (2016) conducted a frame field experiment that found mild but significant risk aversion among doctors in the health domain, and a more pronounced risk aversion in the monetary domain. Moreover, the question of whether risk preferences that are elicited in laboratories using small populations and relatively low stakes can be transferred to medical contexts is a contentious issue in the experimental economics literature (Charness et al., 2013) and reflects a wider debate concerning the validity of lab experiments for explaining behaviors in natural settings (see Galizzi and Wiesen, in press; Kessler & Vesterlund, 2015) . As Galizzi and Wiesen (in press) remark, behavioral and experimental health economists must confront the challenge of establishing
